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A CRITICAL VIEW OF BANK SECRECY ACT
ENFORCEMENT AND THE MONEY
LAUNDERING STATUTES
John K. Villa*
By pleading guilty to a series of Bank Secrecy Act' (BSA) offenses in Feb-
ruary of 1985, the Bank of Boston' heralded a new chapter in the enforce-
ment of the BSA against federally insured financial institutions. This era is
characterized by the realization that federal law enforcement authorities can
obtain unexpectedly large volumes of information about currency move-
ments by aggressively enforcing the BSA against financial institutions and
their officers and employees. While this approach is unquestionably effective
in the short run, it succeeds at the expense of damaging the close relation-
ship that has historically existed between financial institutions and federal
law enforcement authorities.
There are several reasons for the government's new approach to BSA en-
forcement. First, the flood of Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's)3 that
followed the Bank of Boston prosecution revealed that the threat of criminal
charges, or merely of being publicly identified with money laundering, was a
surprisingly potent motivation for financial institutions. Second, public con-
cern over this nation's drug problem, heightened by the deaths of several
prominent athletes,4 gave legislators greater license to take harsh action
against anyone identified with money laundering-an activity that many as-
sociate with drug dealers. Third, financial institutions failed to comply
* John K. Villa is a partner with the law firm of Williams & Connolly in Washington,
D.C. He is the author of a treatise entitled BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDER-
ING, AND EMBEZZLEMENT (1987) published by Clark Boardman Company, Ltd. (New York).
Education: Duke University (A.B. 1970); University of Michigan Law School (J.D. 1973).
1. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-1959 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5324 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5312(a)(2)(T), (u)(5), 5316(a)(l)-(2), 5316(d), 5317(b)-(c),
5318(a)-(f), 5321(a)(1), (4)-(6), (b)-(d), 5322(a)-(c), 5323(a)-(d), 5324 (West Supp. 1987)).
2. United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, CR 85 52-MA (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1985)
(prosecutor's information to which defendant pled guilty).
3. Internal Revenue Service Form No. 4789. Financial institutions are required to pro-
vide the requested information pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22, 103.26-.27 (1987).
4. See, e.g., 9 Days in June; Drugs Claimed Two Sports Stars--and 149 Others, LIFE, Jan.
1987, at 83.
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strictly with the BSA prior to February 1985 and were, therefore, vulnerable
to legitimate criticism.
Nevertheless, the perception by some in the government that the financial
services industry blithely ignored the BSA prior to 1985, and that harsh
penalties are, therefore, required to motivate compliance, is inaccurate. In
fact, the industry performed precisely as regulated industries historically
have acted: the industry reflected the priorities of its regulators, most of
whom had little interest in the BSA because it has minimal impact on the
principal supervisory goal of preserving the safety and soundness of the fi-
nancial institutions.5 Once the regulators emphasized compliance with the
BSA, financial institutions quickly followed suit.
In light of that experience, there is no warrant for concluding that harsh
penalties and criminal charges based upon "flagrant organizational indiffer-
ence" 6 are necessary to motivate the financial services industry. Such an
approach may actually be counter-productive because it fails to distinguish
between deliberate intent to violate the law and indifference to legal require-
ments, thus, disregarding notions of "proportionality" or "just desserts" that
have long been basic to our jurisprudence.7 Unfortunately, the momentum
of current initiatives shows no sign of abating. Unless the government takes
steps to reverse the adversarial posture that it has adopted toward financial
institutions, the long-term relationship between the government and the
banking industry will continue to decline, to the detriment of all.
This Article will chronicle the significant points in Bank Secrecy Act en-
forcement and will analyze the roles that Congress, the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), and the Department of Justice (Justice Department)
have played in this process. The major issues that appear on the horizon will
then be surveyed, focusing principally on the new laundering statutes. 8
5. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 20 (1984) [hereinafter PCOC
REPORT].
6. See infra text accompanying note 71.
7. See A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 66-76 (1976).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (laundering of monetary instruments); id.
§ 1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activ-
ity). For a comprehensive discussion of the new laundering statutes and regulations, see J.
VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND EMBEZZLEMENT (1987).
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I. THE EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE BANK SECRECY
ACT AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE MONEY
LAUNDERING STATUTES
A. The Bank Secrecy Act
The federal law now commonly referred to as the BSA was enacted in
1970 as part of the Bank Records and Foreign Transaction Act (BRFTA).9
As explained in its declaration of purpose,1° the BRFTA was a response to
rising congressional concern over the use of foreign banks to "launder" the
proceeds of illegal activity and to evade federal income taxes. 1 Title I of the
BRFTA, which imposes recordkeeping requirements on financial institu-
tions, has now been assimilated into the text of title 12 of the United States
Code, which imposes regulatory duties on federally insured financial institu-
tions.12 Title II of the BRFTA, originally referred to as the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, has survived in chapter 53, title 31 of
the United States Code.' 3 The provisions of title II are now commonly re-
ferred to as the BSA.
The BSA was controversial because it infringed on the traditionally confi-
dential relationship between the bank and the customer.14 Probably for this
reason, the Secretary of the Treasury, who is charged with enforcing the
BSA, promulgated regulations which pointedly did not exercise the full
scope of his statutory authority. In particular, the regulations did not re-
quire that individuals file CTR's regarding their own currency transactions,
although the statute would have permitted it.15 Instead, the regulations re-
quired only that financial institutions file CTR's for their customers'
transactions. 
16
This self-restraint did not insulate the BSA from attack; in the six years
following its passage, it was challenged twice in the United States Supreme
Court. In California Bankers Association v. Schultz17 and United States v.
9. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1982).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4397-98.
12. The provisions of title I are now codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
13. Prior to 1982, title II was codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. See Note, The Bank Secrecy Act-Conflict Between Government Access to Bank
Records and the Right of Privacy, 37 ALB. L. REV. 566, 578 (1973).
15. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313-5314, 5316 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by 31
U.S.C.A. §§ 5316(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987).
16. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1987).
17. 416 U.S. 21, 77-78 (1974).
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Miller, 8 the Court upheld the major provisions of the BSA. Had it not been
for the Secretary's voluntary limitations on the reach of the regulations,
however, there is reason to believe that the BSA would have been held un-
constitutional as infringing upon the customers' privilege against self-
incrimination.' 9
B. Early Enforcement Efforts
Although the California Bankers Association and Miller decisions dis-
pelled the cloud that had obscured the BSA since its enactment, very little
enforcement activity occurred prior to the early 1980's. Until that time,
prosecutions under the BSA 2" were generally limited to charges against indi-
viduals who transported monetary instruments into or out of the United
States without reporting them on a Report of International Transportation
of Currency (known as CMIR).2"
Beginning in the early 1980's, however, federal prosecutors became in-
creasingly aware of the volume of cash related to illegal drug transactions
that was flowing into the banking system, particularly through financial in-
stitutions in the southeastern United States. They responded with a federal
law enforcement task force known as "Operation Greenback," which
targeted large-scale money laundering for drug sellers and resulted in a sig-
nificant number of prosecutions, including several involving financial institu-
tions.22 The publicity resulting from Operation Greenback prompted other
federal prosecutors to utilize the BSA. Still, only a trickle of cases for failure
to file CTR's was brought between 1982 and 1984;23 the statute was still
regarded as one to be used against customers who circumvented the CTR
filing requirements by paying off bank employees or by using false names.
18. 425 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1976).
19. In California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 71-75, the Supreme Court upheld, by a vote
of six to three, the Secretary's regulations against a challenge that they infringed on the bank
customers' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Justices Powell and Black-
mun concurred, but expressed doubts about the constitutionality of the reporting requirements
should the Secretary impose on individual customers the obligation to file reports on their
transactions, as he was empowered to do by statute. Id. at 78-79. If the Secretary had gone
further with the regulations, and Justices Powell and Blackmun had joined the dissenters, then
the constitutionality of the Act would have been rejected by a vote of five to four.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978).
21. A Report of International Transportation of Currency, Customs Form No. 4790, is
required to be filed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
22. A description of Operation Greenback is contained in PCOC REPORT supra note 5, at
26-27.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.




In 1984, the newly appointed President's Commission on Organized
Crime held a series of sensational hearings at which financial institutions
were roundly accused of engaging in money laundering.2 4 The hearings re-
sulted in the Interim Report to the President and the Attorney General.25 The
report contained a number of recommendations for statutory changes. The
Commission's proposals included an increase in the civil and criminal penal-
ties imposed for BSA violations2 6 and proposed legislation that was the pre-
cursor to the current statutory prohibition of the laundering of monetary
instruments.27
Almost simultaneously, Congress revisited the BSA when, as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,28 it raised the civil money pen-
alties for BSA offenses from $1,000 to $10,000 for each violation.2 9 Because
the BSA was still viewed as a weapon against drug dealers, however, this
statutory change was largely ignored by the financial services industry.
The turning point in BSA enforcement occurred with the guilty plea of the
Bank of Boston in February 1985. The spectacle of a major, well-respected
bank pleading guilty to criminal charges generated remarkable media atten-
tion30 and was the subject of highly publicized congressional hearings.
31
Although many in the banking community, both in and out of government,
privately stated that they felt that the Bank of Boston had been unfairly held
up to public ridicule, it was impossible publicly to come to the defense of an
institution that had pled guilty to criminal offenses.
Many financial institutions reacted to the Bank of Boston case by di-
recting internal auditors to review BSA compliance. All too often those au-
ditors discovered that compliance with the BSA had been haphazard at best
and that a significant number of transactions had not been reported on
CTR's. In most cases, the cause of reporting failures was that financial insti-
tutions historically viewed the BSA as directed toward large, suspicious cash
24. See, e.g., Raab, Financier Declines to Testify in Cash-Laundering Inquiry, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 15, 1984, at A24, col. 1.
25. PCOC REPORT supra note 5.
26.' Id. at 73.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. IV 1986); see also PCOC REPORT supra note 5, at 67-69.
28. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., 39
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
29. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1982) with 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. III 1985).
30. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1985, at 12, col. 1; Am. Banker, Mar. 7, 1985, at 2; Wall
St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 14, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 4,
1985, at 10, col. 5.
31. The First National Bank of Boston: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insti-
tutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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transactions. They devoted little attention to the transactions of established
customers that might also require reporting.
To their dismay, financial institutions also found a confusing body of regu-
lations governing CTR filing requirements. In broad terms, the regulations
required filing of CTR's for all cash transactions exceeding $10,000 by non-
exempt customers.32 The Treasury regulations, however, apparently drew
irrational distinctions between the types of customers who were eligible for
exemption by the financial institution and those who were not. Erroneous
advice by federal officials contributed to the problems. Customs officers,
bank examiners, and even federal prosecutors reviewed exempt lists that
were riddled with obviously ineligible customers, yet they voiced no objec-
tion. In addition, there was confusion over the relationship between the fil-
ing requirements of the CMIR, which requires information about
international transportation of currency or monetary instruments,33 and
those of the CTR. Many financial institutions incorrectly assumed that due
to similarities between the two forms, they would not be required to file a
CTR if they filed the CMIR.
Fearing that they would be the next prosecutorial target for their filing
failures, financial institutions began a massive campaign to comply with the
BSA and filed a virtual flood of CTR's. 34 Some of the financial institutions
that discovered significant filing failures approached the Treasury to disclose
their mistakes and to resolve the problem in hopes of avoiding a criminal
investigation. The Treasury publicly settled with several dozen banks and
announced more than a dozen civil money penalty settlements that exceeded
$100,000. 35 Other institutions that disclosed significant filing failures report-
edly have not been fined.
Although there are good arguments that civil money penalties should not
be imposed where the failure to file had been a mere oversight or the result of
a misunderstanding,3 6 shock waves from the Bank of Boston case apparently
convinced many financial institutions to forego that defense and settle rather
32. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1987).
33. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1987).
34. See Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting-House: Some Observations on the Bank Se-
crecy Act, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 465, 474 (1988).
35. Mr. Rusch reports 36 penalties totalling nearly $16 million. The penalty amounts are
determined by multiplying the number of violations by a negotiated penalty figure of between
$200 and $300 per penalty. Id. at 473.
36. In order to enforce a civil penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
the Secretary must show that the defendant acted "willfully"-a term which has been inter-
preted in criminal prosecutions to mean that the defendant had knowledge of the reporting
requirements and a specific intent to violate them. See United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d
1540, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984). A similar construction of the term would be expected for civil
penalties in the absence of any contrary indication in the legislative history. See United States
[Vol. 37:489
A Critical View
than to take the risk that they would be prosecuted or even sued to enforce a
civil money penalty assessment. Most financial institutions, being particu-
larly cognizant of their public image, concluded they could not risk the
stigma of being charged with a violation that smacked of money laundering.
After a substantial amount of media attention, the publicity surrounding
the civil money penalty settlements peaked in late 1985.3' References to
money laundering in press accounts of these increasingly routine settlements
have gradually receded and have now vanished.
C. The Money Laundering Provisions
Congress returned to the issues of the BSA and money laundering in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,38 which includes subtitle H of title I, referred
to as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA).39 The MLCA
contains amendments to the BSA' and two new laundering statutes.4 ' The
BSA amendments give the Treasury much greater negotiating leverage in
civil settlement cases by increasing the maximum civil penalty for each viola-
tion to the greater of $25,000, or the amount of the transaction, while not
exceeding $100,000.42 In addition, Congress enacted a new penalty for
"negligent" violations, permitting up to a maximum of $500 per violation.43
The MLCA also added a new section to the BSA, which is known as the
"antistructuring statute."'  Section 5324(1) and (2) of the antistructuring
statute prohibit an individual from causing a financial institution either to
fail to file a required report or to file a false report.45 Congress presumably
intended these provisions to address the growing body of cases which have
held that because the regulations promulgated under the BSA do not impose
a duty on individuals to inform the bank of a reportable transaction, such a
duty cannot be imposed in a criminal prosecution without violating the fair
warning requirements of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.46
The most controversial portion of section 5324 of the antistructuring stat-
v. One (1) Lot of Twenty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($24,900) in United States
Currency, 770 F.2d 1530, 1533-34 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
37. See, e.g., Nash, U.S. Penalizes Crocker Bank Over Reporting, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
1985, at Al, col. 2.
38. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
39. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18.
40. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5321(a)(1), (4), (b), 5324 (West Supp. 1987).
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986).
42. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
43. Id. § 5321(a)(6).
44. Id § 5324.
45. Id. § 5324(1)-(2).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985).
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ute is subsection (3) which prohibits the "structuring" of transactions to
evade reporting requirements, although the act of "structuring" is left unde-
fined.4 7 It appears that the prohibition against structuring was intended to
criminalize the division of a single quantity of cash which exceeds the ex-
empt limit into two or more unreportable sums for deposit in different insti-
tutions. If that is, in fact, the statute's objective, it goes considerably beyond
the bounds of most criminal statutes.4 8
Although it is not yet generally recognized, the statutory changes which
will have the greatest impact on financial institutions are the MLCA's two
new laundering statutes.49 Broadly speaking, section 1956 of title 18 of the
United States Code prohibits knowing involvement in a wide range of trans-
actions involving the proceeds of criminal activity either (1) with the intent
to promote unlawful activity5" or (2) with the knowledge that the transac-
tion is designed either to conceal some aspect of the funds, such as its owner-
ship, control, or source, or to avoid the currency transaction reporting
requirements. 1 Another subsection of section 1956 prohibits the transpor-
tation of monetary instruments in foreign commerce with the same intent or
knowledge.5 2 Section 1957 of title 18 of the United States Code prohibits
knowingly engaging in virtually any typical banking transaction involving a
financial institution in "criminally derived property" with a value exceeding
$10,000.1 3 The penalty for violation of section 1956 is a fine of $500,000 or
twice the value of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transac-
tion or transportation, whichever is greater, and/or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years.5 4 The penalty for violation of section 1957 is a fine
of not more than twice the criminally derived property involved and/or im-
47. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324(3) (West Supp. 1987).
48. To analogize from tax law, a seller of goods who bargained for and actually received
one-quarter of the purchase price at the time of sale and the remaining three-quarters the next
year in order to spread his taxable profit over the two-year period would ordinarily not be
accused of tax evasion, let alone criminal conduct. The Internal Revenue Code recognizes that
in the absence of a sham transaction, a taxpayer who actually structures his business transac-
tions to receive the income in future years will be taxed accordingly. See 26 U.S.C. § 453
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (installment method). It is, therefore, surprising that Congress would
take such a diametrically opposite approach in the antistructuring provisions of the BSA and
criminalize such preplanned activity.
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986).
50. Id. § 1956(a)(l)(A).
51. Id. § 1956(a)(l)(B).
52. Id. § 1956(b).
53. Id. § 1957. There is no requirement that the transaction involve more than $10,000 in
cash or currency, only that a monetary transaction occur as defined in subchapter II, chapter
53 of title 31, which could be satisfied by a monetary instrument. Id.
54. Id. § 1956. There are also civil penalties which extend to the greater of the value of
the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transaction or $10,000. Id. § 1956(b).
[Vol. 37:489
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prisonment of not more than ten years.5
Although both statutes leave crucial terms undefined-including, most
significantly, the concept of "proceeds" 56 -- their thrust is quite clear. These
statutes, for the first time, make it a crime to do business with or conduct
financial transactions for any person who derives his monies from certain
specified unlawful activities. The reach of section 1956 is restricted to some
extent by the fact that violation of the statute requires intent to promote the
illegal activity or knowledge of an illegal purpose for the transaction by an-
other person."7 By contrast, mere knowledge of the illegal source of the
funds establishes a violation of section 1957. Thus, section 1957 leaves fi-
nancial institutions subject to prosecution for conducting routine transac-
tions in the accounts of tainted customers.5"
D. The Bank of New England Case
The most significant recent event concerning the BSA occurred in United
States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 5 9 where the Bank of New England was
convicted of committing thirty-one felonies arising out of its failure to file
CTRs. Over a period of more than a year, a customer of the bank, James
McDonough, withdrew more than $10,000 in cash from a single account at
one branch of the bank on numerous occasions.' ° On each occasion, Mc-
Donough presented multiple checks to a single bank teller and received in
return a lump sum of cash in excess of $10,000.61 The jury acquitted Mc-
Donough as well as two bank tellers who were indicted along with the
bank.62 The bank was convicted, however, and fined a total of $1.24
million.63
The BSA provision under which the Bank of New England was convicted
imposes criminal penalties on one who "willfully violat[es]" the CTR filing
requirement. 4 Courts interpreting this standard have held that the govern-
ment must prove the highest level of scienter, or specific intent, imposed by
our criminal law.6 5 In particular, "the defendant [must] have actually
55. Id. § 1957(b)(1)-(2).
56. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of proceeds).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
58. Id. § 1957(a).
59. 821 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 847-48.
63. Id. at 848; see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at D9, col. 3.
64. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West
Supp. 1987).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); United
1988]
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known of the currency reporting requirement and have voluntarily and in-
tentionally violated that known legal duty in order to be convicted of the
crime.
,66
In Bank of New England, the trial court gave controversial instructions on
the issues of corporate "knowledge" and corporate "willfulness.", 6' The trial
court instructed the jury that the bank could be found to have the requisite
specific intent even in the absence of classic respondeat superior liability
where an employee, acting within the scope of his duties and for his master's
benefit, intentionally violates the law.68 The jury was told that in order to
determine the knowledge of "the bank as an institution," it could "sum" up
the knowledge of its separate employees.69 If the "sum" of that collective
knowledge constituted knowledge of the applicable facts and law, the bank
could be deemed to have knowledge of its duties. ° Furthermore, the bank
could be guilty of a willful violation of those duties if it exhibited "flagrant
organizational indifference" to the reporting requirements."' Thus, the trial
court's instructions permitted a collective entity to be found guilty of a seri-
ous federal felony requiring specific intent in the absence of any individual
employee, officer, or agent having the requisite intent.
On review of the bank's conviction, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit upheld these instructions.72 The court reasoned that
"the knowledge obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of
their employment is imputed to the corporation."73 According to the court,
corporations divide aspects of particular duties and operations into smaller
components and the "aggregate of these components constitutes the corpo-
ration's knowledge of a particular operation."7 4 Moreover, the First Circuit
held that the corporate "indifference" standard reflected in the instructions
was appropriate because, with respect to federal regulatory statutes, the
States v. Warren, 612 F. 2d 887, 889-90 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980);
United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
United States v. Chen, 605 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1979). In Eisenstein, the court observed
that "Congress no doubt made the failure to file CTRs a specific intent crime because, without
knowledge of the reporting requirement, a would-be violator cannot be expected to recognize
the illegality of his otherwise innocent act." 731 F.2d at 1543.
66. Warren, 612 F.2d at 890 (emphasis in original).
67. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 854-59.
68. Id. at 855.
69. Id.
70. Id. The instructions stated that, "if Employee A knows one facet of the currency
reporting requirement, B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows
them all." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 859.




courts have defined willfulness as " 'a disregard for the governing statute and
an indifference to its requirements.' "" The Supreme Court declined to re-
view the First Circuit's decision.76
Contrary to the implications of the First Circuit's opinion, the jury in-
structions in Bank of New England reflect a significant expansion of tradi-
tional principles of corporate criminal liability. Neither the BSA itself nor
previous court decisions support the imposition of criminal liability for a
specific intent crime based on the collective knowledge of corporate employ-
ees. More fundamentally, equating "willfulness" with "flagrant organiza-
tional indifference" represents an erosion of the level of scienter that is
prescribed by the BSA. The cases on which the First Circuit relied arose in
the context of "public safety" regulations, such as those governing railroads
and trucking, for which the courts have traditionally imposed a lower stan-
dard of criminal intent than in specific intent crimes such as tax evasion.77
The latter category of offenses has always been understood as involving
moral turpitude and, accordingly, some kind of "evil motive is a constituent
element of the crime. '' 71 Indeed, when holding that the willfulness standard
for "public safety" violations can be met by mere indifference or negligence,
the courts have been careful to emphasize that more is required under stat-
utes where" 'willfully' is... used to mean with evil purpose, criminal intent
or the like., 79 Applying standards developed primarily in civil, public safety
cases to the specific intent crimes arising out of failures to file CTR's poses a
75. Id. (quoting TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127 & n.20 (1985)).
In Thurston, the Supreme Court held that a showing of "reckless disregard" to the require-
ments of the law is enough to establish "willfulness" for purposes of double civil damages
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 469 U.S. at 126; see also 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Under that statute, "evil motive or bad purpose" is not required and
the employer need not have "intended to violate the Act." See 469 U.S. at 126-27 & n.19.
Although the Supreme Court has held that this definition of willfulness had been used in vari-
ous civil and criminal contexts, id., its use with respect to civil damages under the ADEA
provides dubious support for applying an indifference standard to crimes, such as those arising
under the BSA, where specific intent to violate the law is required.
76. Bank of New England v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
77. That line of cases began with United States v. Illinois Central Ry., 303 U.S. 239
(1938), in which the Court considered violations of a federal statute imposing civil penalties on
"knowing and willful" violations of rules governing the incarceration of cattle in railroad box
cars. The Court concluded that, with respect to a corporation, the statute's intent requirement
could be met by "mere indifference, inadvertence or negligence of employees." Id. at 244; see
also Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 248 (8th Cir. 1958) (criminal statute limiting
maximum driving time by truckers); United States v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 30
(D. Minn. 1971) (criminal statute regarding falsification of truck drivers' logs), aff'd, 463 F.2d
175 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 740 (W.D. Va.
1974) (criminal statute regarding truck driving while impaired).
78. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933).
79. Illinois Central Ry., 303 U.S. at 242.
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substantially enhanced risk of criminal liability for financial institutions gen-
uinely attempting to comply with the BSA.
II. CONGRESS, THE TREASURY, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
A. Recent Legislative Changes
The BSA, as well as the more recent laundering statutes, implicitly reflect
a congressional judgment that law enforcement goals can be achieved more
effectively by severely punishing federally regulated financial institutions
than by developing cooperative programs with the banking industry. The
wisdom of this approach is open to serious question because financial institu-
tions historically have been close allies with the law enforcement commu-
nity, and have cooperated with federal law enforcement authorities almost to
a fault."0 Moreover, in its headlong rush to be tough on the banks, Congress
adopted legislative changes that have created insoluble problems for finan-
cial institutions without any corresponding benefit to law enforcement
interests.
A case in point is section 1957 of title 18 of the United States Code.
Before analyzing the flaws in the statute, it is worth observing that the stat-
ute presents a clear departure from traditional concepts of criminal behavior.
Although the criminal law has long forbidden the receipt of stolen goods,"
it has not generally prohibited a person from doing business with or for an-
other simply because unlawful conduct served as the source of the funds for
the transaction. One has the right to sell his house to a gangster as freely as
to a clergyman as long as the parties perform the transaction at arm's length
with no intent to assist the gangster in the commission of a crime.
Section 1957, by contrast, reflects a new approach and one that seems
likely to exact unanticipated social costs. One who suspects a person of of-
fering stolen goods for sale may protect himself by merely declining to
purchase the suspect goods. The social cost of declining that purchase is
minimal. If, on the other hand, it is a crime to do any business at all with
one who deals in the proceeds of illegal activity, then those who are merely
suspected of crimes will find that they cannot engage in everyday commerce;
fearing criminal liability, no one will risk dealing with them. The impact on
the suspected individual can be severe because no knowledgeable person will
80. Indeed, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92
Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), in
order to restrict the flow of confidential customer information from financial institutions to the
federal government. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-35, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9305-07.
81. National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, § 4, 48 Stat. 795 (1934) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1982)).
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transact business with him, yet there may be no means by which the sus-
pected individual can clear himself. The social cost of imposing such a
stigma on individuals-especially those who have not been convicted of, let
alone charged with, any crime-should present grave civil liberties concerns
even for the most ardent law-and-order legislator. It is disappointing to find
that Congress did not seriously debate these important issues at the time it
enacted section 1957.2
Putting to one side the serious policy questions presented by section 1957,
the statute itself is riddled with ambiguities that present enormous problems
for financial institutions. As bank officers confront these ambiguities, they
may well choose to read the statute broadly-thus minimizing their own risk
of criminal prosecution-which would cause the statute to have an even
greater impact than Congress expected. A direct result of loose draftsman-
ship will, therefore, cause the denial of financial services to some innocent
customers by justifiably cautious bankers.
Section 1957 prohibits conducting transactions that involve "criminally
derived property. ' '13 Yet, neither section 1957 nor section 1956 define these
"proceeds" concepts, thus, inviting a wide range of interpretation. Do the
statutes only apply to the direct fruits of illegal activity or do they also apply
to the products of those fruits which are reinvested and thereby change
form? If $25,000 in illegal proceeds are placed into a bank account contain-
ing $75,000 in legal monies, does every check subsequently written on that
account consist of 25% illegal proceeds? If a bank lends a customer $50,000
and subsequently learns that an unlawful activity created his source of funds,
can it accept repayment of the loan? If an individual has legal and illegal
sources of income, can a bank transact any business with him without fear of
prosecution?
Even with adequate definition of the key statutory terms, there is little
chance that financial institutions could apply them accurately. Financial in-
stitutions are ill-equipped to decide whether a particular customer obtains
his funds from illegal sources. It typically takes a trained federal prosecutor,
using experienced investigators and the unparalleled power of a federal
grand jury, months or even years to identify criminal activity. An inexperi-
82. The only direct discussion of this issue appears in the transcript of the mark-up ses-
sion on § 1957 where Representative Lundgren stated: "And I just think it is not a bad thing
for us to send a message to even a small community, if you got a local [drug]trafficker and
everyone knows he is a local trafficker, you don't do business with that person as you do
business with everybody else." Transcript at 17. Representative Shaw later discussed the issue
and stated that he wanted to "make the drug dealers' money worthless." Transcript at 23.
There was no discussion of this issue on the floor of the House or the Senate.
83. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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enced banker applying an unintelligible statute like section 1957 has little
hope of making a correct decision while a customer transaction is pending.1
4
If the financial institution incorrectly decides to terminate business activities
with the suspected customer, a major civil lawsuit is inevitable.
The impossible choices that face many financial institutions demonstrate
that Congress has simply dropped the problem in the lap of the financial
services industry and walked away. None of the options are attractive, but
some financial institutions will ultimately decide that unless a customer
clearly and openly engages in illegal activity, they will not terminate business
contacts with him. While this may be a realistic solution, it is not a happy
one. It means that many financial institutions will, for the first time, know-
ingly operate on the fringe of the criminal law.
The problems in interpreting and applying section 1957 have not been
generally recognized because the statute is new and there are no reported
section 1957 prosecutions. Prosecution of a major bank or senior bank of-
ficer for violating section 1957 undoubtedly will create a furor similar to that
which followed the Bank of Boston case. At that point, financial institutions
will realize, for the first time, that there are no ready solutions to the difficul-
ties posed by these new statutes.
B. Treasury Department Initiatives
Given the political realities, the flaws in the BSA prior to October 1986,
and an apparent shortage of staff, the Treasury has made a creditable effort
to reconcile legitimate law enforcement goals with the maintenance of a con-
structive relationship with the financial services industry. Two criticisms
can be leveled at the Treasury. First, the CTR regulations in section 103 of
title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations85 are unnecessarily confusing.
Second, the Treasury has not adequately encouraged financial institutions to
voluntarily disclose their CTR violations. The first problem results from the
Treasury's failure to direct adequate resources to this issue in the years pre-
ceding 1985. The second problem probably results from a lack of resources,
an unwieldy statutory scheme, and an adverse political climate.
84. Financial institutions will almost certainly receive no assistance from law enforcement
officials in making the decision whether to do business with a particular customer. In many
instances, law enforcement authorities are unaware of the nature of the customer's business at
the time that the financial institution seeks advice. In those cases in which they are aware of
the illegal nature of the customer's business, they would likely refuse to provide substantive
information because it would interfere with an existing investigation, disclose information sub-
ject to strict rules governing grand jury secrecy, see FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(2), or subject the
law enforcement authorities to civil liability from the customer.
85. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11-.67 (1987).
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The regulations governing CTR filing reporting requirements historically
have drawn apparently irrational distinctions between the types of customers
that financial institutions can exempt. For example, if the goal is to detect
criminal activity, then there is no apparent reason to allow financial institu-
tions to exempt bars, restaurants, and race tracks from CTR reporting re-
quirements and, at the same time, prohibit financial institutions from
exempting churches, schools, and hospitals. 86 The line which the Treasury
drew was to permit financial institutions to exempt businesses that customa-
rily dealt in large amounts of cash regardless of the potential for abuse. An
equally reasonable and perhaps more sensible rule might have been to permit
financial institutions to exempt businesses that traditionally had little risk of
criminal activity. Even accepting the Treasury's distinction, however, it was
difficult to justify permitting financial institutions to exempt a retail seller of
goods but not a provider of services.87
Most financial institutions would probably prefer fewer, but clearer, ex-
emptions to more liberal exemption criteria that are difficult to interpret and
apply. 8 The Treasury's rules fail to meet that goal and have contributed
considerably to the confusion over BSA compliance. While the current reg-
ulations are improving, they leave many questions unanswered.89
Another source of confusion is the fact that the filing requirements for
CTR's and CMIR's are inconsistent.9 ° In some instances, financial institu-
tions that filed one form have been fined for not filing the other, despite the
fact that they contain the same basic information and that the Treasury
records the information from both of them in the same data bank.9" Some
financial institutions that have unwittingly violated these provisions and
have therefore been assessed civil money penalties in situations where the
information loss to the government was minimal.
A second criticism of the Treasury is that it devotes too much of its avail-
able resources to extracting civil money penalties from financial institutions
who come forward and voluntarily disclose past BSA violations. While
86. Id. § 103.22(b)(2)(ii).
87. Id. § 103.22(b)(2)(i).
88. Indeed, a number of financial institutions have concluded that the problems of inter-
preting and applying the Treasury's exemption criteria are greater than the cost of eliminating
all exemptions and filing CTR's for all transactions, exempt or not. These institutions have
discarded their exempt lists, a decision that has resulted in a substantial increase in CTR filings
for an already overburdened system. This practice, which some have dubbed "malicious com-
pliance," is the most convincing rejection of the entire exemption process.
89. It is also possible, however, that significant changes in the regulations, even to achieve
clarification, would cause more problems than they would solve in light of the necessity to
reeducate compliance personnel who are now finally familiar with the BSA.
90. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
91. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a)(4) (1987).
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there does not appear to be any public information regarding the total
amount of resources devoted to the voluntary disclosure cases, the Treas-
ury's small staff-in what is now known as the Office of Financial Enforce-
ment-seems to devote much of its time to the voluntary disclosure cases.
At the same time, the Treasury rarely disturbs the vast majority of financial
institutions that do not voluntarily disclose past BSA violations. This strat-
egy has the unfortunate effect of punishing the good corporate citizens who
come forward while ignoring the financial institutions that elect not to dis-
close their past violations. It is difficult to conceive of a more counter-
productive approach to a regulatory scheme that must, after all, rely upon
voluntary compliance to be effective.
There are probably several reasons for the Treasury's approach. The first,
and probably most significant, is that there are so few Treasury personnel
and so many voluntary disclosure cases, often involving relatively large fi-
nancial institutions, that the Treasury has no resources to pursue the
nonvolunteers. An important second reason is that the Treasury once
lacked the statutory authority to compel financial institutions to disclose
BSA violations. This omission was corrected in the MLCA in 1986,92 yet
the Treasury still has not fully exercised its authority. 93 The third, and more
debatable reason for aggressively pursuing those financial institutions that
voluntarily disclose, is that congressional overseers are anxious to see a
tough enforcement posture by the Treasury against the largest banks, which
are the institutions that typically make voluntary disclosures. Thus, even
though a "get tough" approach is remarkably shortsighted in the overall
regulatory strategy, Congress seems to favor it and it appears to have influ-
enced the Treasury's actions, especially in the year following the Bank of
Boston prosecution.
A review of the Treasury's enforcement of the BSA reveals that it has
performed reasonably well under very difficult circumstances, including in-
sufficient staff, a poorly drafted statute (until the MLCA), and unenlightened
congressional oversight. By avoiding unnecessary bank bashing, the Treas-
ury has managed to retain credibility with the financial services industry as a
responsible regulator. One must, however, conclude that to the extent that
the Treasury had hoped for an effective voluntary disclosure program which
would have encouraged financial institutions to come forward with past vio-
lations, it has failed. Without any incentive to do so, most financial institu-
tions have simply avoided conducting historical reviews, or if they have
92. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(a), (b) (West Supp. 1987).
93. The Treasury promulgated regulations implementing the summons authority in June




performed them, they have not submitted them to the Treasury. While the
threat of future sanctions has encouraged most institutions to achieve a high
level of current compliance, the dubious benefits of voluntary disclosure of
past errors to the Treasury have not been great enough to induce such
disclosures.
C. Justice Department Activities
Criminal prosecutions under the BSA have, with a small number of signif-
icant exceptions, been unremarkable.94 In large part, the Justice Depart-
ment has prosecuted bankers or customers for engaging in flagrant and
intentional violations of the BSA by failing to file CTR's or filing false CTR's
with the intent to mislead the government." The small number of more
important prosecutions have been brought against major banks whose crimi-
nal liability results from some theory of "organizational indifference" to the
BSA. The first such significant prosecution appears to have been against the
Bank of Boston,9 6 followed more recently by Bank of New England.97
The conviction of the Bank of New England may have produced one of
the most important modern decisions on the issue of corporate criminal lia-
bility. If taken to its limits, the decision undoubtedly could lead to scores of
indictments of federally insured financial institutions for BSA violations, as
well as for violations of the new laundering statutes. Bank of New England
gives the Justice Department a significant new weapon against financial insti-
tutions. Under the "flagrant organizational indifference" standard,98 vast
numbers of financial institutions are subject to prosecution for lack of BSA
compliance prior to the Bank of Boston prosecution in February 1985,
which jolted their compliance officers to life. Even more chilling for finan-
cial institutions is the prospect of the Justice Department applying the "col-
lective knowledge" concept in section 1957 prosecutions99 to convict
financial institutions of laundering violations when neither the financial insti-
tution nor any of its employees or officers had any criminal culpability
whatsoever. "
94. There have been no civil Bank Secrecy Act suits.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1986).
96. Because the First National Bank of Boston pled guilty rather than going to trial, it is
difficult to ascertain all of the facts of the offense. The reports surrounding the plea, however,
did not suggest that the institution was engaged in deliberate noncompliance. See sources
cited supra notes 30-31.
97. See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); see also supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 71, 75, and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
100. Because the required scienter for violation of § 1957 is merely that the person conduct
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Any critique of the Justice Department's enforcement of the BSA and the
laundering statutes should be deferred until it becomes clear how these pow-
erful new tools will be used. If these theories are used against morally neu-
tral conduct-and they clearly have that potential-then it will erode the
industry's respect for the processes of administering justice. As Professor
Packer has observed, the application of criminal sanctions to morally neutral
behavior has the effect of decriminalizing the criminal law and subtly chang-
ing people's attitude toward criminality.101 While this concept is typically
applied to criminal activity by individuals, it also applies to corporate behav-
ior. If financial institutions perceive that the government is arbitrarily prose-
cuting banks for violating statutes which the banks are attempting to obey,
then some banks will for the first time divert effort from attempting to obey
the law to attempting to escape detection of the inevitable violations. The
short term gains from an aggressive use of these tools will not outweigh the
long term damage between those financial institutions and federal law
enforcement.
III. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The first round of BSA enforcement has concluded with fears of prosecu-
tion that have brought the financial services industry into substantial compli-
ance. The question for the future is whether the relationship between the
financial services industry and federal law enforcement authorities will con-
tinue to be strained or will begin to improve. To answer that question, one
must consider the important issues that will arise in the next several years
under the BSA and the new laundering statutes.
The first issue is whether Congress will amend section 1957 of title 18 of
the United States Code, so that the financial services community will have
some notion of the statute's reach. Because of the severe penalties for viola-
tions of the statute °2 and the fact that it embodies a relatively new concept
in our criminal law, it would be extraordinarily painful for the government
to define critical elements of the statute through criminal prosecutions.
Even if the prosecutions that are ultimately brought interpret the statute
a financial transaction involving $10,000 or more in criminal proceeds with the knowledge of
the fact that they are the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, a financial institution could
conceivably be held criminally liable on a collective knowledge theory. Consider the following
example: a Bank officer in Los Angeles learns that John Smith had derived $15,000 from a
criminal act, but the officer does not know that Smith is a Bank customer; two days later an
employee of the same Bank in San Francisco accepts a $12,000 check deposited by Smith, not
knowing that Smith had obtained the monies through unlawful activity. This would constitute
a violation of § 1957. See supra note 70 (quoting jury instructions).
101. H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 358-59 (1968).
102. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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reasonably, the statute's reach will not be clear for a number of years, if ever.
In the interim, financial institutions that attempt good faith compliance with
this provision will inevitably err on both sides: those that construe the stat-
ute too narrowly will become the target of grand jury investigations and
possibly prosecuted, while those who construe it too broadly will be sued by
customers with whom they unjustifiably refuse to do business. Financial in-
stitutions should not be forced to run that gauntlet; the statute should be
clarified.
The second issue is whether the government-specifically the Justice De-
partment-will develop a "safe harbor" concept for section 1957. Even if
the statute is amended to address its ambiguities, a financial institution that
merely suspects a customer of engaging in criminal activity has difficult
choices. It can continue to do business with the customer and expose itself,
and its individual officers and employees, to criminal liability for violating
section 1957 if the customer is ultimately shown to have engaged in illegal
activity and the suspicious incidents are deemed sufficient to give the bank
knowledge of his activities (which always seems easier in hindsight). Alter-
natively, the bank can refuse to conduct business with the customer, running
the risk that the customer was innocent, or at least cannot be proven guilty,
and will sue.
Mr. Rusch is correct in observing that a financial institution that identifies
a customer involved in conducting a suspicious transaction may report that
fact to the government on a criminal referral form, and if the referral falls
within certain guidelines specified in the Right to Financial Privacy Act,1 ° 3
the financial institution cannot be held liable for making the referral or for
failing to inform the customer of it." This is good as far as it goes. The
real question, however, is whether federal law provides protection for the
financial institution that decides not to continue doing business with this
suspicious customer in order to protect itself and its personnel from criminal
prosecution under sections 1956 and 1957. Evidently, there is no protection.
In a case arising in Maine prior to the effective date of these statutes, a bank
learned this lesson the hard way when it abruptly terminated its relation-
ships with a customer after being told, incorrectly, by a federal agent that its
customer was an underworld figure. ' 0 5 The customer sued and recovered a
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
104. See Rusch, supra note 34, at 482 n.73.
105. Maine Bank Penalized for Heeding Rumors of Organized Crime Link Am. Banker,
Apr. 30, 1987, at 7, col. 1 [hereinafter Maine Bank] (discussing Ricci v. Key Bancshares of
Maine, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1137-38 (D. Me. 1987)).
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$12.5 million verdict against the bank.16
One would think that if the financial institution were in doubt and filed a
criminal referral on the customer, 10 7 it would have advanced law enforce-
ment goals and should, therefore, be relieved of the threat of prosecution
even if it continued to do business with that customer. That is not the case.
In fact, a prosecutor might use the making of a referral against the financial
institution as an admission to show that it knew of the possibility that the
customer engaged in illegal activities. This will discourage referrals. Be-
cause the possibility of a civil suit against the bank often seems more likely
than prosecution for a laundering violation, the bank will probably decide to
continue doing business with a current customer unless the evidence of ille-
gal activity is very strong. If it continues to do business, then it may also
decide against filing a criminal referral to avoid later being charged with
knowledge of criminal activity. The result is that the likelihood of a referral
declines and, consequently, the government is deprived of significant law en-
forcement information.
A more rational solution would be to adopt a safe harbor rule providing
that if a bank files a reasonable and good faith referral on a customer, then it
will not be prosecuted for further dealings of the same kind with that cus-
tomer. This would encourage the prompt submission of referrals and allow
the financial institutions to believe that law enforcement authorities are
working with them rather than against them.
The third issue will be the extent to which the Justice Department uses the
"flagrant organizational indifference" and "collective knowledge" standards
from the Bank of New England decision. 0 ' These concepts could be used to
prosecute many financial institutions for their total ignorance of the BSA
prior to February 1985,1°9 yet no useful purpose would be served at this
point by such prosecutions. Similarly, the financial services industry has to-
tally failed to appreciate the dangers inherent in section 1957 in the year
after it was enacted and might therefore be vulnerable to the same "indiffer-
ence" theory of prosecution in the future.
106. Maine Bank, supra note 105, at 7. But see Ricci v. Key, 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1138-39
(D. Me. 1987) (setting aside the $12.5 million jury award, but retaining the punitive damages).
107. All of the regulatory agencies require that the financial institutions subject to their
respective jurisdictions file criminal referrals, or reports of suspected crimes, with the agency
and the Justice Department. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1987) (Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency referral regulations).
108. See supra notes 70, 97-100, and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying note 98. The statute of limitation for criminal prosecu-
tion is five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
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IV. CONCLUSION
No thoughtful commentator can look at the Bank Secrecy Act and laun-
dering statutes without concluding that they will continue to present unique
policy questions for Congress, the Justice Department and the Treasury.
The ultimate verdict on whether these powerful statutes are used properly,
and effectively, will depend upon whether those charged with drafting and
administering these laws carefully define their long-term goals and enlist the
help of the financial services industry to achieve those goals.

